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ABSTRACT
We construct a simple three-tier agency model, which is an extension of the familiar
screening (self selection) models and can be placed in line with the collusion literature à la
Tirole (1986, 1992), including Kofman and Lawarree (1993)’s auditing application. The basic
trade-off consists of the discrete reduction in information rent vs. the improvement of margin-
al incentives (outputs), and thus we have “Efficiency at the top” and “Downward distortion at
the bottom” at the optimum. Then, we theoretically compare the “collusion-proof ” regime and
the “no-commitment/renegotiation” regime. We extensively utilize a graphical explanation,
which provides us with clear intuition and logic of the optimal solutions and their comparative
statics, as well as robust implications for corporate governance reform. Last, as an extension,
we show that when the private information of the two agents is perfectly correlated, the princi-
pal can implement the full information first best optimum at no incentive cost.
Key words: Mechanism Design, Adverse Selection, Collusion, Supervision, Renegotiation,
Yardstick Mechanism, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: D82, D86
1. Introduction
Recently, auditing has been rapidly growing in importance in Japan, as well as in the U.S.
and Western countries, to meet the needs of corporate governance. Corporate scandals such as
those that rocked Yamaichi Securities, Daiwa Bank, Snow Brand Milk Products, and Kanebo
in Japan and Enron and WorldCom in the U.S. are examples of firms that failed to build up
effective corporate governance. In those cases, collusive supervision/auditing and revelation
of false information were common occurrences. Auditors/supervisors usually have greater
access to accurate information on the agents, but are subject to collusive pressure (the collu-
sive offer) from the auditees (agents). The means by which adequate supervision (auditing) is
used to enhance the efficiency of corporate governance and by which collusive supervision
(auditing) can be deterred are important parts of corporate governance reform.
In a typical framework of Japanese firms’ top management organization, a shareholders’
meeting elects a director (or the board of directors) and an auditor who audits the execution of
the work of the management and makes a report to the shareholders. With this auditing sys-
tem, which has been legally amended several times, it is often said that the auditor has access
to a great deal of information inside the firm, including the ability of top managers to perform
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their jobs, while on the other hand it is doubtful that the auditor can objectively supervise the
management while maintaining his independence. Indeed, there is a notion that collusive
auditing often exists where an auditor and a manager collude to manipulate information. Thus,
corporations should optimally utilize auditing information in order to increase the interests of
the shareholders through an arrangement in which the auditor and manager do not collude.
Many Japanese firms, such as Toyota and Canon, do preserve and try to improve the tradition-
al Japanese auditing system. Our paper can be viewed as an analysis of such top management
organization in a hidden information setting.
Literature exists that deals with the issues associated with corporate governance and
auditing in a three-tier agency model with collusion, developed by Tirole (1986, 1992) and
Laffont and Tirole (1991), Laffont and Martimort (1997) etc. In particular, Kofman and
Lawarree (1993) applied a three-tier agency model—consisting of the two-type (productivity)
agent, the internal and external auditors (supervisors), and the principal—to the issue of audit-
ing and collusion.1
In this paper, we construct a simple three-tier agency model in line with the above collu-
sion models. Since it is an extension of the familiar screening (self-selection) models à la
Baron and Myerson (1982) and Maskin and Riley (1984), the basic trade-off in the model
consists of the discrete reduction in information rent vs. the improvement of marginal incen-
tives (outputs), and thus we preserve “efficiency at the top” and “downward distortion at the
bottom” at the optimum.
Then, the optimal collusion-proof contract in the principal-supervisor-agent three-tier
regime built by adding the auditor (supervisor) into the hierarchy has the property whereby (1)
efficiency at the top (for the good-type agent) and (2) downward distortion at the bottom (for
the bad-type agent), and the downward distortion is mitigated at the optimum, in comparison
with the principal-agent two-tier regime. The optimal solution allows simple comparative stat-
ics, which shows that downward distortions from the first-best output levels diminish when
the accuracy of supervision increases and the efficiency of collusion declines. This is a specif-
ic contribution to the literature. Whether the principal indeed has an incentive to introduce a
supervisor—i.e., selects a three-tier hierarchy—depends on the balance between the net bene-
fits from both the improvement of marginal incentives and the reduction in information rent
and the resource cost of the auditor (supervisor).
Though we basically consider a situation where the principal can commit to a collusion-
proof contract, i.e., a situation of “full commitment,” we analyze as an extension what happens
when the principal cannot fully commit to the mechanism and renegotiation is unavoidable.
When the principal commits herself to the supervisor reward scheme, but does not commit to
the one for the agent, she will be tempted to modify the initial contract (or the outcome) uni-
laterally, using the information revealed by the supervisor. This situation is similar to the
ratchet problem and the renegotiation problem caused by the lack of the principal’s commit-
ment in the dynamics of the incentive contracts, studied early by Laffont and Tirole (1988)
and Dewatripont (1988) etc. If the agent anticipates such a modification, since he can benefit
from a failure by the supervisor to report his type truthfully, he will offer the supervisor the
transfer (side payment) equivalent to his information rent. Thus, the principal must pay the
supervisor in opposition to the collusive offer by the agent. Hence, the principal can strictly
improve his payoff ex-post, but must bear the ex-ante incentive cost. In this situation, it would
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1 Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)’s recent textbook presents a simple version of the collusion models (Tirole (1986),
Kofman and Lawarree (1993)).
be interesting to see whether the principal can do better in the equilibrium without her partial
commitment than if she can fully commit.
Throughout the paper, we extensively utilize a graphical explanation, which is indeed
beneficial in that we can provide clear intuition and logic of the optimal solutions of the
model and their comparative statics, as well as robust implications for reform of corporate
governance.
Incidentally, the principal cannot attain the first-best under the principal-supervisor-one
agent hidden information setting with collusion, and downward distortion at the bottom always
occurs.  Introduction of the supervisor can mitigate, but cannot solve the problem perfectly,
and indeed in some case the distortion may become bigger (as in the no-commitment/renego-
tiation regime). So, finally, we show that in the case where the private information of the two
agents is perfectly correlated, the principal can implement the full information first best opti-
mum at no incentive cost. Intuitively, the principal places the two agents in a prisoner’s dilem-
ma game and both truth-telling and the first-best optimal incentives can be induced in the
unique dominant strategy equilibrium, without giving any information rent.
2. Principal-Agent Hidden Information Setting 
We consider two players: a principal (P) and an agent (A). The principal owns the firm
and hires the manager (agent) to run it. Gross profits are X =θ+ e, where θis the manager’s 
ability to run the firm and e is the effort he supplies. θa priori belongs to and the prior
beliefs are Pr , where 0 < h < 1. Expending effort e costs the manager in
disutility, which satisfies R+. W is the wage payment the 
agent receives, and then his utility is . We normalize the agent’s reservation utility 
as 0. The timing of the game is as follows. Prior to contracting, θis determined randomly by 
nature and is known only to the manager (agent). The principal proposes a take-it-or-leave-it 
contract offer to the manager. The form of the contract is . X is the level of gross profits2
the manager is required to obtain and W the wage he will be paid if he generates the required 
level. If he produces less than X, he receives no pay. If he generates more than X, he will still
receive only W. If he rejects the offer, the game ends. If he accepts the offer, a contract is
signed and the principal is fully committed. This is a standard screening problem.
Now, we examine the optimal solution. Let X and X be the profits specified for
the good-type agent ( ) and the bad-type agent ( ), respectively. We write XH and 
XL for X and X , respectively. Defining W and W similarly, we write WH and
WL for W and W , respectively. These are the wages specified by the contracts.
The benchmark first best solution maximizes the expected profits, subject to the IR 
(Individual Rationality) constraints, which require that the manager be willing to sign a con-
tract whatever her type. That is, 
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Substituting and into the objective function results in the
expected total surplus maximization:
The first order conditions for the optimum are:
In the first best optimum, the marginal benefit of output 1 is equal to the marginal cost of out-
put for both types . Hence, we have and . This means 
that first best efforts are equal for both types . We also see that 
Next, under the assumption of asymmetric information on θ, we seek the separating 
contracts, which induce the two types to behave differently. For this, the contracts must be
incentive compatible.
IC (Incentive Compatibility) requires:
(1a) states that the good-type agent prefers to select the contract intended for him rather
than the contract intended for the bad-type agent , i.e., the good-type agent’s IC constraint.
(1b) states that the bad-type agent prefers to select the contract intended for him rather
than the contract intended for the good-type agent , i.e., the bad-type agent’s IC constraint.
The IR (Individual Rationality) constraints require:
The first best solutions are not incen-
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2 We will later rephrase (gross) profit X as output X in order to make the terminology clearer in the theoretical analysis.
tive compatible for the good-type agent , since he has an incentive to tell a lie (mimic/pretend 
that type ). Indeed, we can check the incentive of the good type .
If he tells the truth “ ”, he obtains .
If he says “ ” (i.e., he lies), he obtains 
Hence, he has an incentive to tell a lie (mimic/pretend), i.e., not incentive compatible.
As is typical in such problems, only the good type’s IC (1a) and the bad type’s IR (2b) bind 
at the optimum. From (2b), . Substituting it into (1a) with equality, we have 
This is the information rent for the good-type agent . Hence, the optimization problem can
be written as follows
Substituting and into the
objective function yields
The first order conditions for the optimum are:
From these conditions, we have the following proposition, which is a familiar result in the lit-





In the principal-agent regime with no supervisor, the second-best solution has the properties of 
(1)Efficiency at the top (for the good-type agent) 
(2)Downward distortion at the bottom (for the bad-type agent) 
Proof: As for XH, the first order condition is the same as the first best case, so .
As for XL, evaluating the first order condition at X = , we have
. This means that the principal can raise his virtual 
payoff by decreasing XL from the first best level . Hence, we have .■
Graphical Explanation
Let us explain the argument so far in a graphical manner. First, the payoff function of the
type θ agent is . In order to depict the indifference curve of the 
type θ agent in the diagram, we totally differentiate both sides of , 
and obtain . Then, putting it in order, we have the marginal rate of 
substitution . We easily see that the marginal cost of output
is decreasing in type θ, i.e., the good type has a gentler indifference curve 
(a smaller MRSXW) for any point . Remember that the first order conditions for the first 
best optimum are . We have , which means 
that . That is, at the f irst best solution, 
and . From these facts, we can depict the indifference curves
of both types and the first best contracts G and B in the diagram.
However, the first best solution is not incentive compati-
ble for the good type under asymmetric information, since he has an incentive to tell a lie
(mimic type ) and select . Indeed, the good-type agent 
can obtain by telling a lie, instead of 
by telling the truth. Below Figure 2 depicts this fact.
So, the principal takes the optimal balance between the expected total surplus and the information 
rent for the good type. As a result, we have the results of (1) Efficiency at the top (for the
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good-type agent ) and (2) Downward distortion at the bottom (for the bad-type
agent ) . The intuition is that a small reduction in XL from the first best results
in a second-order (marginal) reduction in total surplus for the bad type , but generates a
first-order (discrete) reduction in the good type ’s information rent through relaxing the IC






for the bad type , and
for the good type .
The Figure3 shows the result.
The result of can be understood by looking at Figure 4, which shows that the optimal
solution is determined such that the marginal benefit 1 equals the marginal virtual cost (the 
marginal cost plus the marginal information rent ).




3. Collusion and Supervision
Now, we introduce a third player, the supervisor, into the model. The principal has access,
at a cost z, to the supervisor who is an internal auditor and can, for each θ, provide proof of
the fact (θ) with probability p, and with , is unable to obtain any information.3 We
assume that proofs of θcannot be falsified, and thus the agent is protected against false
claims that his type θis higher/lower than what it really is. On the other hand, the agent can
potentially benefit from a failure by the supervisor to truthfully report that his type is ,
when the supervisor observes the signal θ. A self-interested supervisor will collude with the
agent only if he benefits from such behavior. Specifically, let us assume the following collu-
sion technology: if the agent offers the supervisor a transfer (side payment) t, he benefits up to
kt, where . The idea is that transfers of this sort, being prevented by the principal, may
be hard to organize and are subject to resource losses. We follow the literature in assuming
that side-contracts of this sort are possible (see, e.g., Tirole 1992).
To avoid collusion, the principal will have to offer the supervisor a reward WS for provid-
ing the information , such that the following coalition incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied.
Indeed, once the information is obtained, the principal will drop agent ’s payment 
WH to , and not pay the information rent to agent . The agent is thus ready to
pay the supervisor an amount of , and the value of this side 
payment to the supervisor is kUH, where . Therefore, hiring a supervisor and eliciting 
his information requires the principal to pay kUH to the supervisor if the (hard) information of
is provided. Substituting WS = kUH into the principal’s objective function, the virtual
surplus for the bad type in the principal-supervisor-agent regime is, 
Hence, the expected total virtual surplus is:
The first order conditions for the optimum are:
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3 The supervisor’s signal received from the agent may be informative s =θ with probability p, or 
non-informative s =φ with probability 1– p.
Proposition 1:
In the principal-supervisor-agent regime, the optimal collusion-proof solution has the follow-
ing properties:  
(1) Efficiency at the top (for the good-type agent) 
(2) Downward distortion at the bottom (for the bad-type agent) is mitigated, i.e.,
Result (2) comes from the reduction in the virtual cost, i.e., the total and marginal infor-
mation rents by the introduction of a supervisor with k ≤ 1. The point is the reduction in the
virtual marginal cost due to + pk ≤ 1, compared with the standard no-supervisor case.
The following figure clearly shows this point.
We can readily perform a comparative statics, and the rationale of the results is clear and
intuitive.
Proposition2: Comparative statics on 
The optimal collusion-proof solution is non-decreasing in the parameter p, and non-
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Figure 5
increasing in the parameter k.
Proof:
The coefficient of the marginal information rent decreases as the
parameter p increases. Hence, the marginal information rent (and so the marginal virtual cost) 
decreases as p increases. This brings about 
the increase in the optimal output . Similarly, the coefficient of the marginal information
rent increases as the parameter k increases. Hence, the marginal
information rent (and so the marginal virtual cost) increases as k increases. This brings out the
decrease in the optimal output . ■
4. No-Commitment /Renegotiation Regime 
So far, we have considered a situation where the principal can commit to the collusion-
proof contract. Now, we examine more explicitly the timing of the game. The principal has 
access to the supervisor, who chooses a message , where means that he did not
obtain any information. If the principal receives the message from the supervisor that the type 
information is θ, the principal will have an incentive to renegotiate the original contract. The
principal can raise her payoff by eliminating the downward distortion in the bad type .4 Namely, 
instead of the contract at the no-information phase , the principal will offer the 
efficient (first best) contract , and exploit the information rent from the good type
. If the good-type agent anticipates this modification, 
since he can benefit from a failure by the supervisor to report his type truthfully, he will
offer the supervisor the side payment U , for which the supervisor benefits up to kt, where 
. Thus, the principal must pay to 
the supervisor in opposition to the collusive offer by the good type, in order to elicit the true
information. In summary, the principal strictly improves his payoff by changing into 
ex-post, but the ex-ante incentive cost –kU arises. This is the trade-off for the principal
when the supervisor obtains the proof of true information , with probability p. Only when
the supervisor cannot obtain any information for θwith probability , does the principal 
commit herself to the initial scheme and the same trade-off between the total surplus and the
information rent emerges.
Formally, the expected virtual surplus in the principal-supervisor-agent regime is written as
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4 This idea is similar to the renegotiation problem from lack of commitment to the long-term contract, which was first
considered by Dewatripont (1988)
When the principal determines the output targets for the no-information phase
, she must consider the information rent for the supervisor pkU as well as the informa-
tion rent for the good agent U . The principal will optimize the bad agent ’s out-
put XL, in order to mitigate the collusive pressure by the good agent when the supervisor
observed the signal , and to deal with the standard trade-off between the total surplus
generated by XL and the information rent for the good agent when the supervisor could not 
obtained any information for θ. Thus, in this regime, the principal maximizes the following
modified virtual surplus.
The first order conditions for the optimum are, 
We now have the following proposition on the comparison of equilibrium incentives.
Proposition3:
Let and be the outputs (in the no-information phase) of the good type and the
bad type , respectively. Then, we have:
(1) Efficiency at the top (for the good-type agent) 
(2) Downward distortion at the bottom (for the bad-type agent) is aggravated:
in the above proposition comes from the increase in the virtual cost, i.e., the total 
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and marginal information rents in this regime. Virtual marginal cost increases by , 
compared with the standard no-supervisor case. Figure 6 clearly shows this point.
Now, we can perform a comparative statics on the optimal solution .
Proposition4: Comparative statics on 
The optimal output in this no commitment/renegotiation regime is non-increasing in the
parameter p, and non-increasing in the parameter k.
Proof:
The coefficient of the marginal information rent increases as the parameter p increases. 
Hence, the marginal information rent (and so the marginal virtual cost) 
increases as p increases. This brings about the 
decrease in the optimal output . Similarly, the coefficient of the marginal information 
rent increases as the parameter k increases. Hence, the marginal information rent
(and so the marginal virtual cost) increases as k increases. This brings about the decrease in the 




5. The Trick of the Model
Indeed, we have so far considered the following parameterized objective function: 
where z is a parameter, and z = 0 corresponds to total surplus maximization and z = 1 corre-
sponds to the standard second best problem of principal and one agent. Similarly, z = +
pk corresponds to the principal-supervisor-agent regime with full commitment (see Section 3) 
and z = corresponds to the no-commitment, renegotiation regime (see Section 4). 
We see that the objective function is additively separable in XL and XH. Hence the program 
can be broken into two: 
From the first line we see that XH maximizes the total surplus for the good type, and
obtain the “efficiency at the top” result.
As for XL, the formula for the optimal solution of XL in each regime is
Since the square bracket of the second term of right-hand side is positive, we see that as the
parameter z becomes bigger (smaller), the marginal virtual cost becomes bigger (smaller).
Hence, the optimal solution for XL becomes smaller (bigger). As a result, we have Proposition
4 on the comparison of the optimal solutions.
6.Yardstick Mechanism in Perfectly Correlated Environments
As shown so far, the principal cannot attain the first best under one-agent hidden information 
setting. That is, “downward distortion at the bottom ” occurs. The introduction of
the supervisor can mitigate, but cannot solve the problem perfectly, and indeed in some case 
the distortion may become bigger (as in the no commitment /renegotiation regime). 
In this section, we show that in the case where the private information of the two agents is
perfectly correlated, the principal can implement the full information first best optimum at no
incentive cost. That is, we show that the principal can attain the points G and B in Figure 1 in
the unique equilibrium. 
Remember that . When the agent 
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of type chooses the point B in one- agent setting, he can
obtain the information rent , as already examined above.
Now, we assume that there are two agents, whose private information is perfectly correlated, 
and do not introduce the supervisor into the setting (for simplicity).
Formally, we focus on the case where the private information of the agents i, j is 
perfectly correlated, i.e., 
The principal proposes the following contract to the agent i = 1, 2, i ≠ j.
First, we explore the incentive of the agent of type in the state under the above
scheme. His payoff function is written as , which is the payoff when
the agent chooses the output Xi given that the other agent chooses Xj.
Suppose that the other agent chooses the output . 
Then, if the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff 
.
If the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff 
Hence, the agent has an incentive to choose the output .
Next, suppose that the other agent chooses the output .
Then, if the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff
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If the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff
.
Hence, the agent has an incentive to choose the output . That is, regardless of the 
other player ’s choices, the agent has an incentive to choose the output .
The incentive structure of the agent is also the same. Regardless of the other play-
er ’s choices, the agent has an incentive to choose the output . The choice of
is the dominant strategy for the agent .
The payoff matrix is as follows.
Perfect correlation of the private information = is crucial. As the payoff matrix
shows, the principal places the two agents in a prisoner’s dilemma game. By exploiting this 
structure, the principal can implement the full information first best optimum in the unique
dominant strategy equilibrium.5
Next, we explore the incentive of the agent of type in the state . His payoff 
function is written as when the agent chooses the output Xi
given that the other agent chooses Xj.
Suppose that the other agent chooses the output . 
Then, if the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff
.
If the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff 
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5 A key problem in the design of optimal contracts in correlated environments is the possibility of multiple equilibria
in the subgame played by the parties whose private information is correlated. As noted by Demski and Sappington (1984),
multiple equilibria do not pose a problem when the private information is perfectly correlated.
The negative sign is due to the convexity of the cost function .
Hence, the agent has an incentive to choose the output .
Next, suppose that the other agent chooses the output .
Then, if the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff
If the agent chooses the output , he will obtain the payoff
.
Taking the difference of the payoffs, we have
Hence, the agent has a strict incentive to choose the output , or no incentive to
deviate from to .
Thus, regardless of the other agent ’s choices, the agent has an incentive to
choose the output . The choice of is the dominant strategy for the bad agent .
The incentive structure of the agent is the same. Regardless of the other player
’s choices, the agent has a strict incentive to choose the output . The choice
of is the dominant strategy for the bad agent . 
The payoff matrix is as follows.
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Perfect correlation of the private information = is also crucial here. As the
payoff matrix shows, the principal places the two agents in a prisoner’s dilemma game, thereby 
implementing the full information first best optimum in the unique dominant strategy equilib-
rium at no incentive cost.
Summarizing the arguments so far, we have:
Proposition5:
Under perfect correlation of the private information of the two agents, the principal can
implement the full information first best optimum in the unique dominant strategy equilibri-
um6, without giving any information rent. The equilibrium contracts are Pareto efficient in both 
states and .
6. Conclusion
Recently, auditing to meet the needs of corporate governance has been rapidly growing in
importance in Japan, as well as in the U.S. and Western countries. Given this trend, we were
motivated to build a theoretical model to examine how supervision (auditing) could be utilized
in order to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance and to deter collusive supervi-
sion (auditing). We constructed a simple three-tier agency model, which is a natural extension
of the familiar screening (self selection) models and can be placed in line of the collusion lit-
erature à la Tirole (1986, 1992), including Kofman and Lawarree (1993)’s auditing applica-
tion. The basic trade-off involved in adding the auditor (supervisor) into the hierarchy is the
benefit obtained by the discrete reduction in information rent and the improvement of margin-
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6 Of course, in this dominant strategy equilibrium, the Nash incentive compatibility constraints are also satisfied, in
the sense that it is optimal for the agent i to behave truthfully given that the agent j behaves truthfully, and vice versa.
al incentives (outputs) versus the resource cost of the auditor (supervisor). This bottom line
was consistently preserved through the model. 
Throughout the basic model of the paper we considered a situation where the principal
can commit to a collusion-proof contract, i.e., “full commitment.” We used the revelation prin-
ciple, solving programs in which the principal always prevents collusion between the auditor
(supervisor) and the manager (agent). In the optimal contract, nobody colludes: this is called
the collusion-proof principle. However, this does not imply an obvious inconsistency with
reality, where collusive supervision (auditing) often makes headlines, as stated in the
Introduction. The revelation principle and the collusion-proof principle are solution tech-
niques which facilitate characterization of the optimal contract.7
We then showed as an extension what happens when the principal cannot fully commit to
the mechanism and the renegotiation is unavoidable. When the principal commits herself to
the reward scheme for the supervisor, but does not commit to the one for the agent, she is
tempted to modify the initial contract (or the outcome) unilaterally, using the information
revealed by the supervisor. The situation is similar to the ratchet problem and the renegotiation
problem caused by lack of the principal’s commitment in the dynamics of incentive contracts,
studied early by Laffont and Tirole (1988), and Dewatripont (1988) etc. If the agent antici-
pates such a modification, since he can benefit from a failure by the supervisor to report his
type truthfully, he will offer the supervisor the transfer (side payment) equivalent to his infor-
mation rent. Thus, the principal must pay the supervisor in opposition to the collusive offer by
the agent. The principal can strictly improve his payoff ex-post, but must bear the ex-ante
incentive cost. However, the comparison between the payoffs for the principal is ambiguous. It
depends on the relative sizes of several terms between a “no-commitment” regime and a “col-
lusion-proof, full commitment” regime. The principal can do better in the equilibrium without
some of her commitments than if she can fully commit.
In any case, the principal cannot attain the first best under the principal-supervisor-one
agent hidden information setting with collusion, and “downward distortion at the bottom”
always occurs. Introduction of the supervisor can mitigate, but cannot solve the problem per-
fectly, and indeed in some case the distortion may become bigger (as in the no-commitment
/renegotiation regime). So, finally, we show that in the case where the private information of
the two agents is perfectly correlated, the principal can implement the full information first
best optimum at no incentive cost. Intuitively, the principal places the two agents in a prison-
er’s dilemma game and both the truth-telling and the first best optimal incentives can be
induced in the unique dominant strategy equilibrium, without giving any information rent.
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7 Indeed, if we consider an incomplete grand contract situation like Tirole (1992), Laffont and Tirole (1991), and
Suzuki (2007) did, equilibrium collusion can improve efficiency. Such models indeed could be usefully applied, in such
fields as political economy, regulation, and authority delegation in organizations.
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